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Pro-se defendant Douglas E. Larsen hereby submits his peti-
tion for rehearing of appeal pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Defendant states that this petition is 
presented in good faith and is not interposed for delay and 
relies upon specific material facts and points of law which 
defendant believes the court must further consider. 
IV 
MATERIAL FACTS 
1. This appeal stems from a default judgment that was 
issued in case No. 940013590-CV in the Circuit Court in favor of 
plaintiff N.A.R., LC. on or about December 7, 1994. (Ref. 
Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "C".) 
2. That default judgment was taken unbeknown to defendant 
Larsen after plaintiff N.A.R., LC. and Mr. Larsen entered into a 
negotiated settlement of the matter and Larsen had forwarded a 
full and final settlement payment on October 20, 1994. (Ref. 
Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "D".) 
3. That plaintiff accepted the final settlement payment 
which specifically denominated settlement terms and cashed the 
money order by depositing it into the N.A.R., LC. bank account. 
(Ref. Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "A".) 
4. That plaintiff fraudulently altered the settlement terms 
by "blacking out" the restrictive terminology contained on the 
postal money order prior to depositing it into the N.A.R., LC. 
account. (Ref. Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "B".) 
5. That plaintiff N.A.R.f LC. hid the fact that the money 
order had been altered from defendant Larsen, thereafter. (Ref. 
Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "D".) 
6. That plaintiff had failed to ever properly serve summons 
and complaint to defendant Larsen and failed to complete proper 
service even though it was advised of that fact. (Ref. 
Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "D".) 
7. Plaintiff further proceeded with its pattern of 
negligent behavior by intentionally forwarding notice of default 
judgment to an incorrect address. (Ref. Appellant's Brief, 
Exhibit "G".) 
8. The Circuit Court refused to set aside default judgment 
without hearing on July 6, 1995. (Ref. Appellant's Brief, 
Exhibit "K".) 
9. The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the Circuit Court's 
default judgment, without hearing, based solely upon the review 
of the service of process question on March 7, 1996. (Ref. March 




THE APPELLATE COURT DECISION WAS 
BASED SOLELY UPON THE SERVICE OF 
SUMMONS QUESTION. 
The Appellate Court rendered its decision based upon the 
assertion that service of process was adequate under Rule 4(j), 
U.R.C.P., which involves "refusal of copy." In fact, defendant 
Larsen did not refuse to accept a copy of the process, as is 
suggested. Defendant Larsen was never properly served (Ref. 
Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "D", para. 3), that when he became 
aware of the complaint he settled the claim (Ref. Appellant's 
Brief, Exhibit "D", paras. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9), that he never 
personally received any document from N.A.R., LC. until the 
motion and order in supplemental proceedings was served upon him 
in May, 1995, (Ref. Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "D", para. 8). 
Plaintiff's process server admits the following in 
affidavit: 
1. That she attempted service at the office building of 
defendant on October 24, 1994, and October 26, 1994. (Ref. 
Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "F", paras. 1 and 2.) 
2. That the office was not open to the public and "someone" 
unknown to her was seen inside the premises. (Ref. Appellant's 
Brief, Exhibit "F", para. 3.) 
3. That Ms. Draper did not approach anyone, no one 
conversed with Ms. Draper and no one either accepted or refused 
service. (Ref. Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "F", paras. 3 and 4.) 
4. That Ms. Draper dropped the papers in the mail slot at 
the office address. (Ref. Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "F", para. 4.) 
In business associate Murleen Hewitt's letter to plaintiff, 
dated October 27, 1994, are the following statements: 
1. That Ms. Hewitt had been at a trade show during the 
prior two (2) days and discovered the summons on the office floor 
on October 27th. (Ref. Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "E", para. 1.) 
2. That Douglas Larsen was out of town prior to October 
24, 1994, and would not return until November 7 or 8, 1994. 
(Ref. Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "E", para. 1.) 
3. That Ms. Hewitt suggested that service should be 
completed upon Mr. Larsen's return after November 8, 1994. (Ref. 
Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "E", para. 1.) 
The facts of the matter fail to make any showing that 
plaintiff completed service or even attempted service pursuant to 
Rule 4(e)(1) and 4(g). Further, no material facts of any sort 
exist to support Rule 4(j) claims wherein it must be shown that 
Mr. Larsen refused to accept a copy of process. In fact, a 
showing was made that Mr. Larsen wasn't even in Salt Lake City at 
the time Ms. Draper allegedly saw "someone" in the office and 
dropped the summons through a mail slot. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT PROPER 
SERVICE WAS NEVER ATTEMPTED. 
Rule 4(e)(1), U.R.C.P., calls for service of an individual 
"At the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode with 
some person of suitable age and discretion there residing, or by 
delivering a copy of the summons and/or complaint to an agent 
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of 
process." 
In fact, no attempt was made to serve Mr. Larsen at his 
dwelling house or usual place of abode, no person of suitable age 
or discretion was served and no agent was authorized by appoint-
ment or by law to receive service of process. By definition, 
this complaint involved a claim for the performance of dental 
work upon Mr. Larsen and clearly calls for personal service. 
A 
POINT III 
RULE 4(g), U.R.C.P. SQUARELY ADDRESSES 
THE ISSUES WHICH CONTROL THE MATTER. 
While references were made to New York state and federal 
case law, Rule 4(g), U.R.C.P., directly addresses plaintiff's 
allegation that the person to be served was avoiding service of 
process instead of Rule 4(j). Under Rule 4(g), "Where there 
exists good cause to believe that the person to be served is 
avoiding service of process, the party seeking service of 
process may file a motion supported by affidavit requesting an 
order allowing service by publication, by mail or by some other 
means. The supporting affidavit shall set forth the efforts made 
to identify, locate or serve the party to be served, or the 
circumstances which make it impractical to serve all of the 
individual parties." 
The rules clearly and specifically call for actions under 
Rule 4(g) that were not undertaken by plaintiff in this instance 
and thereby invalidate the faulty service that was undertaken. 
By its own terms under Rule 4(g), this paragraph "permits the 
court to fashion means of service reasonably calculated to 
apprise the parties of the pendancy of this action" and the 
requirement of a specific court order of substituted service 
"must itself be served so that the party served will be able to 
determine the sufficiency of service and the time as of which his 
or her response is due." This case reflects a classic example of 
what transpires when the applicable rules of civil procedure are 
ignored. 
POINT IV 
THE REFERENCED CASE LAW DEFINES 
DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES. 
While the Errion v. Connell case as cited does support Rule 
4(j), U,R.C,P., this decision is different from the action at 
bar. In the Errion case personal service was deemed to have been 
completed pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, at 
the defendant Amy Errion's dwelling house or usual place of 
abode, that defendant Amy Errion personally refused service, and 
the process server advised defendant's brother, identified as 
Fred Errion, (a person of suitable age and discretion) that he 
was completing service upon defendant by leaving summons with 
Fred Errion. 
In the current action, the undisputed evidence submitted to 
the court reflects the facts that the process server approached 
the business offices of Mr. Larsen rather than his residence 
address, specifically identified no one, communicated with no 
one, and pushed the papers through a mail slot. No evidence 
exists to show that Mr. Larsen ever refused service or that 
service was ever attempted upon any person of suitable age and 
discretion. In fact, evidence exists to show that Mr. Larsen was 
not even in Salt Lake City at the time service was attempted. 
The Penney, Inc. vs. I.S. Laboratories, Inc. and Bossuk v. 
Steinberg cases also address service of process matters where 
defendants were approached in person, identified by the process 
server, and slammed the door upon the process server, thus 
knowingly and willfully refusing to accept process. 
In the instant action, the process server left the summons 
at an office complex wherein Mr. Larsen was only one of many 
people who utilized the building, service was not specifically 
attempted or completed upon either Mr. Larsen or a person of 
suitable age or discretion and when noticed of these facts, 
plaintiff failed to complete proper service. 
The Federal Court held in Milligen v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 
463, 61 S. Ct. 339, 342, 85 L. Ed.2d 278 (1940), that the 
governing constitutional principle is the due process requirement 
that the mode of service be "reasonably calculated to give defen-
dant actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be 
heard, or more specifically, that the means of notice must be 
such as one desirous of actually informing the defendant might 
reasonably adopt to accomplish it. See Graham v. Sawaya, 632 
P.2d 851, 854 (Utah 1981), wherein it was held that the due 
process clauses of the United States and Utah Constitutions 
require notice to a party before his or her rights are affected 
by a judgment. A requirement of actual notice must be shown for 
an in personam judgment, not just a showing that the means of 
notice employed was the best available in the circumstance. 
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 
306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950), it was held that: 
But when notice is a person's due, process 
which is a mere gesture is not due process. 
The means employed must be such as one 
desirous of actually informing the absentee 
might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. 
Objective review of this action reflects the fact that, upon 
determining that a claim was going to be initiated, Mr. Larsen 
not only did not seek to avoid the matter, but contacted N.A.R., 
LC. directly, negotiated a settlement with plaintiff and 
forwarded full and final payment of the debt on October 20, 1994, 
six (6) days prior to the attempted service of summons. Mr. 
Larsen relied upon the settlement agreement and acceptance of 
payment by N.A.R., LC. thereafter and had no reason to suspect 
that plaintiff would initiate a scheme to undertake double 
recovery. 
In the Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. case, 339 
U.S. at 314, it was determined that the heart of the due process 
clause is the individual's right not to be deprived of property 
or liberty without an opportunity to present a defense and that 
right has little remedy or worth unless one is informed that the 
matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appeal or 
default, acquiesce or contest. 
POINT V 
SET ASIDE OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
IS JUSTIFIED. 
Defendant believes the larger issue in this appeal involves 
the appropriateness of setting aside default judgment based upon 
the matters of double jeopardy, fraudulent alteration of a U.S. 
money order, and a pattern of plaintiff's wrongful conduct, in 
addition to the question of proper service of summons. 
The Utah courts have consistently held that default 
judgments are not lightly taken as they do not resolve matters 
based upon merit. Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 
P.2d 507 (Utah 1976); Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 
189 (Utah 1962) . 
Under these circumstances, valid questions of material fact 
exist to justify the set aside of default judgment in this action 
that must not be ignored by the Court of Appeals. Case law 
reflects the fact that relief from default judgment has routinely 
been granted upon any reasonable excuse of a defaulting party. 
See Westinghouse Elect. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contracor, 
544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975); Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney 
Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 1976). In this instance, defendant 
Larsen has factually supported substantial questions of material 




There is no question that based upon the facts of the 
matter, the applicable rules of civil procedure and case law, 
that defendant Douglas E. Larsen is entitled to set aside of the 
default judgment in this matter. Careful review of the facts, as 
alleged by the parties in this action, clearly reflect the fact 
that defendant has not fully and fairly received his due process 
rights in this action when one considers either reasonable and 
equitable grounds or the technical aspects of the law. Utah 
courts have consistently rendered such decisions on the side of 
defendants wherein contentious issues of material fact exist, 
especially in regard to default judgments. 
Defendant respectfully requests the court to reconsider 
defendant's appeal based upon this information. 
DATED this / / day of March, 1996. 
D0UGLA2T E. LARSEN 
Defendant/Appellant Pro Se 
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